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in whom rests the full and final power, ordain otherwise 
by express constitutional amendment. 
As to this particular case" regardless of the right pur-
portedly given petitioner by the provisions of section 12 (b) 
of ,the California Real Estate Act (Deering's Gen. Laws 
(1937), Act 112, p. 30, at p. 40) to seek a review pursuant 
to the provisions of Chapter I of Title 1 of Part III of the 
Code of Civil Procedure (certiorari) and. whether or not ~uch type of review could be lawfully ordained by the Legis-
lature (see Standard Oil 00. v. State Board of Equal. (1936), 
sUpra,6 Ca1.2d 557 [59 P.2d 119]), he also had the right (avail-
able to all persons) to petition for the remedy of his own 
choosing (mandamus). Whether his petition stated facts 
entitling him to that remedy was a question of law and of 
judicial discretion depending on the substance of the facts 
stated; it was a question which would not be concluded by 
the mere existence of a possible alternative equitable proce-
dure (see Sheehan v. Board of Police Oommrs. (1920), 47 
Cal.App. 29, 36 [190 P. 51] ; Great Western Power 00. v. 
Pillsbury (1915), 170 Cal. 180, 182-183 [149 P. 35]). The 
discretion of the trial court is not shown to have been 
abused. 
[L. A. No. 18581. In Bank. May 3, 1943.) , 
SECURITY-FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LOS ANGE-
LES (a National Banking Association), Respondent, v. 
BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST & SAV~ 
INGS ASSOCIATION (a National Banking Associa-
tion), Appellant. ' 
[1] Negotiable Instruments-Form and Requisites-Payability to 
, Bearer-'-Fictitious Payee-Existent Person.-The fact that 
,[1] When negotiable instruments deemed payable to fictitious 
persons within statute that makes paper payable to bearer, note 
18 A.L.R. 15. See, also, 19 Ca1.Jur. 819; 7 Am.Jur. 840. 
'Mc~. Dig. Ref'lrences: [1,4] Negotiable Instruments, § 13; [2] ~egotlable Instruments, § 41; Banks, § 107; [3] Negotiable In-
struments, § 159; [5, 6J Negotiable Instruments § 17' [7J Banks § 168. " , 
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checks are drawn to an actual person does not preve~t his 
name from being that of a fictitious payee, where it IS not 
intended that he should have an interest therein. Such ,,11; 
check, however, is not payable to bearer unless the ~act .that 
the payee is fictitious is known "by the person makmg It so 
payable." (See Civ. Code, § 3090, subd. 3.) 
[2] Id.-Derenses-Forgery: Banks-Payment on Forged Indorse-
ment.-A forged indorsement is ordinarily a nullity. It ,does 
not pass title to a check, and a ba~k may not ~harge to the 
account of its depositor a check paId on the baSIS of such, an 
indorsement. A drawer, however, who intentionally makes, a 
check payable to a fictitious payee, cannot obtain the benefit 
of these rules, as he knows that the check will be indorsed 
in the name of the payee by someone bea:ing another n~~e., 
When the drawer entrusts an employee WIth the responsIbil-
ity of signing checks, the signer takes the place of the 
drawer and his knowledge binds the drawer. , 
[3] Id.~Checks--Rights and LlabilitleS-Fraudof Bookkeeper.-
Where the drawer of a check or his signer is the victim of the 
fraud of the bookkeeper who is charged ,with examining the 
drawer's accounts and informing him of his liabilities, the 
person buying or paying the check has no right to a r~l~a~e, 
at the expense of the innocent drawer, from the responsIbility 
of determining the authenticity of the indorsements. ',' 
[4] Id.-Form and Requisites-Payability toBearer';';':'FictitiO~ 
Payee-Knowledge of Employee.-Fictitious payee checks are: 
not payable to bearer unless the signer is aware ~f the fra~d. 
This is true even though a bank officer"authorlZed to SIgJ1; 
checks signs them in reliance on vouchers of another, employee, 
whose fraud in preparing the vouchers automa~i?ally)ed ,to 
the officer's unwitting execution of checks to fictItIouS payees. 
[5] Id.-Form and Requisites-Execution"':'Deli~ery.~Deli:very: of 
a negotiable instrument is not essential' to its exe,cu.tion~~\ 
check is complete when received by the person W;ho IS t(), d~ 
liver it, and lack of delivery is no defenseagaitlst a hold,er, 
in due course. (See Civ. Code, § 3097.) ", ' , 
[6] Id.":"'Form and Requisites-Execution-Delivery-Check Pa.y-, 
able to Fictitious Payee.-Ordinarily the signer remains the 
[3lWho must bear loss as between drawer ~who deliverschec'k:, 
to an impostor and one who cashes or pays It upon the latters-
indorsement, note, 22 A.L.R. 1228. See, also, 8 Am.Jur. 314 .. " , ' 
[4] Intent and knowledge of employee or agent of person: sought. 
to be charged as affecting application as to latter rule, that D,e~ 
gotiable paper payable to fictitious, person is payable, to bearer, 
note, 74 A.L.R. 822. See, also, 7 Am.Jur. 844. 
.T.t 
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person making a completed check payable to a fictitious payee, 
regardless of whether another employee is responsible for see-
ing that it reaches the payee. 
[7] Banks-Collections-Clearing Houses.-A clearing house 
transaction in which checks presented are charged to the bank 
on which they are drawn is usually tentative oJ;lly, and the 
cleared checks are not regarded as paid until the time has 
passed under the clearing house rules during which the drawee 
bank can return them to the forwarding bank. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. A. L. Pierovich, Judge assigned. Affirmed. 
. ActioJ? against bank honoring checks on forged indorsement 
to recover on bank's guaranty of prior indorsements. Judg-
ment for plaintiff affirmed. 
Louis Ferrari, Edmund Nelson and G. L. Berrey for Ap-pellant. 
Jennings & Belcher for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The plaintiff, Security-First National 
Bank, issues numerous checks drawn on itself. It was the sole 
duty of one of plaintiff's officers, A. M. Hadley, to sign such chec~s. Ea~h check was presented to him with a debit slip, 
and if the slIp showed that the check was properly authorized 
and that funds were available in the proper account, he si~ed the check. Among the employees who prepared debit 
slIps and wrote checks, but who were not authorized to sign 
checks, was Dee L. Ellis, Jr., head of the accounting division 
of the trust department. Ellis prepared a number of checks 
for Hadley's signature, drawn to the order of L. W. Bobbitt 
together with debit slips in the usual form on the basis of 
which Hadley signed the checks. There was such a person 
as Bobbitt, but he knew nothing of the transaction and Ellis 
did not intend that he receive any of the checks.' Ellis had 
become acquainted with one of defendant's employees and 
had no difficulty in establishing an account with defendant 
as agent for Bobbitt. He indorsed the name of L. W. Bobbitt 
On the checks, deposited them in this account, and later with-
drew the funds deposited. Defendant presented the checks 
through the Los Angeles clearing house and in accord with 
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the cl~aring house rules guaranteed all prio~ ind?rsenieri~: 
When plaintiff received the checks from the. cl~anng honse, 
they were returned to the accounting division o~ the trust 
department where they fell into the hands of Ell1~,. who de~ 
stroyed them. By manipulation of the out~tandmg~~hecks 
file Ellis was able to conceal the fraud for a tlIl;e, b~t It. was 
eventually discovered, and plaintiff b::ought thiS s~t on de-
fendant's guarantee. Defendant appeals from the Judgment 
for plaintiff. . C'ViI C d [1] Defendant invokes section 3090 of the. 1 0 e 
(§ 9(3) of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act) pro-
viding: "The instrument is payabl: .to bearer .••• (3) .When 
it is payable to the order of a fictItIous or no~-exl~tent per-
son, and .such fact is known to the person ma~g. It so pay-
bl "If these checks are payable to a fictItIous payee, :n;'a'r~ therefore bearer paper, defendan~'s guarantee of the 
indorsements imposes no liability. (Unwn B. & T. 00. v. 
Security-First Nat. Bank, 8 CaL2d 303 [65 P.2d 3551.) ~e 
fact that Bobbitt was an actual person does ~o~ prevent hiS 
name from being that of a fictitious payee, fo~ 1~ IS settled ~h~t 
an instrument is drawn to the order of a fictItIous payee If .It 
is not intended that the person named on its ~ace ~ave any 
interest in it. (Union B. & T. 00. v. Securdy-Ftrst Nat. 
Bank supra.) Such a check, however, is not payable to bear-
er uniess the fact that the payee is fictitious is known by "the 
person making it so payable." (Civ. Code, § .3090.) .. 
.. [2] This condition limits the extent to w~lch the fiCtItlOuS 
payee rule qualifies the usual rules governm~ the .effe~tof 
f.orged indorsements. A forged indorsemen~. IS ordm,arily a 
nullity. It does not pass title to a check (C1V. C~de, § 3104; 
AngZo-Oalifornia Trust 00. v. French Amencan Bank, 
.108 Cal.App: 354 [291 P. 621]) and a ~ank may not;charge to 
the account of its depositor a check paId on the hasls of such 
an indorsement. (Hatton v. Holmes, 97 Cal. 208 [31 P. 
1131] . Atwell v. Mercantile Trust 00., 95 Cal.App. 338 [272 
:Po ·799].) Where the drawer intentional~y ~akes .a check 
payable to a fictitious payee, he knows that It WIll be mdorsed 
in the name of the payee by Someone bearing another n~m.e 
and he thus cannot obtain the· benefit of these rules. SimI-
larly, when he entrusts an employee with the responsibility 
of signing his checks, the signer takes t~e place of the. drawer. 
His signature creates the check and hiS knowledge bmds the 
i·. 
, . 
.; 
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drawer. [3] When the drawer or his signer is the victim 
of the fraud of the bookkeepe.r who is charged with examin-
ing the drawer's accounts and informing him of his liabilities, 
the person buying or paying the check has no right to a 
release at the expense of the innocent drawer from the re-
sponsibility of determining the authenticity of the indorse-
ments. (See Brannan's Negotiable Instruments (Beutel's 
sixth ed. 1938) p. 223,224.) 
[4] Hadley, not Ellis, was the signer of plaintiff's checks. De-
fendant, however, asserts that Hadley acted as a mere automa-
ton, a,nd that Ellis's authorization was in effect an order 
to him to execute the checks. While Hadley ordinarily signed 
in reliance on vouchers executed by Ellis, the record shows 
that he refused on at least one occasion to sign a check au-
thorized by Ellis. In many large businesses, it is necessary 
for the officer authorized to sign checks to do so in reliance 
on the vouchers of another employee, although that employee 
has no authority over him: In this situation, as in the execu-
tion of plaintiff's checks, the fraud of the employee preparing 
the vouchers automatically leads to the, unwitting execution 
by the signer of checks to fictitious payees. Since this sever-
ance of the function of investigating disbursements from that 
of executing checks creates the only situation in which checks 
can be commonly executed to a fictitious payee without the 
knowledge of the person making them so payable (See Note, 
74 A.L.R. 822), it is probable that the requirement of knowl-
edge was included in the section to prevent such checks from 
becoming payable to bearer. Thus, in Los Angeles Invest-
ment 00. v. Home Savings Bank, 180 Cal. 601 [182 P. 293, 
5 A.L.R. 1193], one Emory, the manager of the insurance de-
partment of a real estate firm, prepared requisitions repre-
senting false insurance claims. He was not authorized to sign 
checks. On the basis of his requisitions another officer signed 
checks drawn to the order of various persons, and in their 
n.ames Emory signed and negotiated them. It was held that 
those checks were not payable to bearer, because the officer 
signing them was the person making them payable to a ,ficti-
tious payee, and he had no knowledge that the payee wa.s 
fictitious. Defendant attempts to distinguish the Home Sav-
ings Bank case on the theory that the representations of the 
defrauding employee were there subject to an independent 
audit, so that they were not the direct cause of the execution 
of the fictitious payee checks. The opinion, however, attaches 
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no significance to this fact, declaring unequivocally that. ficti-
tious payee checks are not payable to bearer unless th~ SIgnor 
is aware of the fraud. Throughout the many years SInce }the 
Negotiable mstruments Law was drafted, this interpretation 
has been adopted almost universally throughout the country: 
(See Brannan's Negotiable Instruments, supra, p. 208et seq., 
and the long list of cases there cited; 7 Am.Jur. 844; ~O C.f,. 
580.) Since the same result was com~onl! reached In t~ 
country before the adoption of the Negotla~le Instruments 
Law (see Kulp, The Fictitious Payee, 18· MICh.L.~v. 296,; 
Note, 22 A.L.R. 1229) the decision in the Home SaVIngs Bank 
case and similar cases may be supported on the theory that 
section9(3) of the Negotiable Instruments Law was inten.ded 
to codify the common law. The question whether it was so:,nd 
policy to adopt the rule is one for the .Legislature to deCIde. 
Defendant relies particularly on Unwn Bank ~ Trust .00. 
v. Security-First Nat. Bank, supra, Goodyear Tire ~ Rubber 
00. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1 Cal.App.2d 694 [37 P.2d 483], 
and Rancho San Oarlos v. Bank of Italy, 123 CaLApp. 291 
[11 P.2d 424]. The Union Bank & Trust C~. case involved 
the fraud of one Williams, the director and aSSIstant secret~ry 
of two corporations that maintained accouhts at the Umon 
Bank. He was authorized by his employers to sign checks, 
on which counter-signatures' were also required. He drew 
and signed checks on his employers' accounts and procured 
the necessary co-signatures. He presented these checks to the 
Union Bank and upon a written requisition on behalf of his 
employers, drawn and signed by himself, purchasEld cashier's 
checks to the order of the payees designated in' the requisi-
tions. He later indorsed the checks in the name of the, paye~ 
and deposited them. It was held thai the checks were. pay-
able to bearer. ' The court emphasized the sPecial sit,uation 
of a bank 'in issuing cashier's checks, a form ofcUirency for 
which the bank is paid in advance. It is not concerned With 
who the payee should be. For this reason the Jp1!>wledge of 
the purchaser may determine whether a cashier's check to a 
fictitious payee is payable to bearer. Williams, asauthori'Zed 
by his employers, purchased. and designated the payee 'of th~ 
cashier's checks. The court also emphasized the fact tha~ 
Williams was authorized to sign his employers" checks. He 
could therefore have drawn fictitious payee checks' agains~ 
his employers' ac'Count that would have been paya~le 'to bear~ 
1-" , 
~ ': 
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cr. The court concluded that the same result followed when 
Williams used this authority to sign personal checks as the 
means of causing the execution of cashier's checks to fictitious 
payees. 
In the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. case one Downs was 
authorized to sign checks, which, however, were not valid un-
til signed by certain co-signers. Downs drew and signed a 
number of checks and his co-signers signed on the strength of 
his signature. He then forged the indorsements of the payees 
and collected the checks. The court pointed out that Downs 
knew that the payee was fictitious when he drew and signed 
these checks, and made it dear, that the requirement of co-
sigriers did not restrict the effect of his knowledge. Since the 
joinder of the co-signers was automatic, the court treated the 
case as if Downs we-re the sole signer, and concluded that the 
checks were payable to bearer. The opinion, however, ex-
pressly asserts that if Downs had not been the signer of the 
checks, his knowledge would not have been controlling. 
In Rancho San Oarlos v. Bank of Italy, supra, an employee 
was entrusted with signed blank checks and was authorized 
to fill in the blanks. He completed them -in the names of 
fictitious payees, .indorsed the checks in those names and then 
negotiated them. It was held that they were payable to bear-
er. The court viewed the authority to complete a signed 
blank check by filling in the name of the payee and the amount 
payable as the equivalent of the authority to sign an other-
wise complete check. 
[5] Defendant in the present case contends that Ellis de-
livered the trust department checks because they were sent 
to the payees by the accounting division. Delivery of a nego~ 
tiable instrument, however, is not essential to its execution. 
A check is complete when received by the person who is to 
delher it, and lack of delivery is no defense against a holder 
in due course. (Civ. Code. § 3097.) [6] Ordinarily, therefore, 
the signer remains the person making the completed check 
payable to a fictitious payee regardless of whether another 
employee is responsible for seeing that it reaches the payee. 
(Los Angeles Investment 00. v. Home Savings Bank, supra; 
United States Oold Storage 00. v. Oentral Mfg. Dist. Bank, 
343 TIl. 503 [175 N.E. 825, 74 A.L.R. 811]; Seaboard Nat. 
Bank v. Bank of America,193 N.Y. 26 [85 N.E. 829]; J or-
dan Marsh 00. v. National Shawmut Bank, 201 Mass. 397 
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[87 N.E. 740, 22 L.R.A. N.S., 250] i Oity of St. Paul v. Mer. 
chants' Nat. Bank, 151 Minn. 485 [187 N.W. 516, 22 A.L.R. 
1221].) A contrary conclusion has been arrived at when an 
employee has discretion to decide when and whether checks 
shall be delivered. (See Goodyear Tire & Rubber 00., v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, supra, and cases there cited.) The sound· 
ness of these decisions need not be considered, since the claim 
that Ellis had such authority is based only on conjecture. 
The evidence shows merely that the checks were returned to 
the aecounting division to be forwarded to the payees. " 
[7] After the checks were cleared they were, returned to 
the trust department accounting d.ivision, which, was. ~nder 
the supervision of Ellis, and there examined andbalance~ 
against the file of outstanding checks. Defendant concludeS 
from these facts that Ellis was .the officer who, paid them, 
and argues that in so paying them Ellis represented that ,he 
knew of nothing wrong with the checks or their indorsements, 
and accepted defendant's guarantee of the indorsements with· 
out disclosing that they were-, forged. Defendant contends 
that because Ellis performed these acts in the course of his 
employment, plaintiff is estopped' from denJ"ing the validity 
of the indorsements. The checks were not paid merely by 
the settlement at the clearing house. This settlement is usu-
ally tentative only, and the cleared checks are not regarded 
as paid until the time has passed under the clearing house 
rules during which the drawee bank can return them to the 
forwarding bank. (Sneider v~ Bank of Italy, 184 Cal. 595 
[194 P. 1021, 12 A.L.R. 993].) It is difficult to regard any 
one employee as paying the checks. If one were to be singled 
out it would most likely be the employee who has authority 
to decide whether or not the checks should be returned to 
the forwarding bank. There is no showing that Ellis had such 
authority. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
SHENK, J.-I dissent. In my opinion the judgment 
should be reversed for the reasons stated by the District 
Court of Appeal of the Second Appellate District, Division 
Three, in an opinion prepared by Justice Hartley Shaw, 
acting pro tempore, and concurred' in by the then Presiding 
220.2d-e 
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Justice B. Rey Schauer and Justice Parker Wood. I am 
satisfied that that opinion correctly interprets the statute 
and case law of this state as applied to the facts and reaches 
a conclusion which is consonant with reason and justice. I 
. adopt it as a reflection of my views on the subject. It is as 
follows: 
"There are two defendants in this action, but, since the 
defendant bank only is before us on this appeal, the word 
'defendant' where hereinafter used, refers to it only, unless 
otherwise indicated. The plaintiff issued certain checks 
~rawn upon itself, which came to the defendant upon forged 
mdorsements. The defendant impressed its clearing house 
stamp upon these checks, presented them to plaintiff through 
the clearing house and obtained payment. This stamp in-
cluded the words, 'all prior endorsements guaranteed,' and 
plaintiff brings this action to recover on that guaranty. 
Judgment went for plaintiff and defendant appeals. 
'(The checks in question were drawn and signed in plain-
tiff's trust department, and purported to be made for pay-
ments due from trusts held by it, to the order of a person 
named L. W. Bobbitt. Plaintiff had in its trust department 
several divisions, including an accounting division the head 
of which was the other defe.ndant, Ellis, who haa'no official 
title. All of these checks were false and fictitious checks 
writte~ by Ellis, but not signed by him, he having n~ 
authorIty to sign checks for plaintiff, and none of them rep-
resented any actual payment due from plaintiff. After they 
were signed Ellis obtained possession of them, indorsed the 
name of L. W. Bobbitt upon them and deposited them in' 
an account he had opened with defendant bank at one of 
its Los Angeles branches, in the name of Bobbitt. Ellis 
then drew the money out of defendant bank on checks to 
which he signed Bobbitt's name, and used it hhnself. In 
dealing with defendant bank Ellis did not pose as Bobbitt, 
but as th~ latter's agent, making all of the signatures except 
the first mdorsement before presenting them to the bank. 
There was such a person as L. W. Bobbitt known to Ellis 
but he did not live' in California, had nothing to do with 
these acts of Ellis, knew nothing of them had no interest 
in the checks, was not intended by Ellis t~ have either the 
checks or the money procured on them, and did not in fact 
receive either. 
"The mode in which Ellis accomplished this defalcation is 
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described in much detail in the record, but a brief state-
. ment of it here will suffice. In its trust department plain-
tiff had an assistant trust officer named Hadley, who was 
also an assistant secretary. He was referred to as a 'sign-
. ing officer' and his sole function was to sign checks and 
other papers and documents coming from the trust depart-
ment. He signed from 800 to .1500 of these various papers 
a day, and of course had no time to investigate the various 
transaCtions out of which they arose, to see if they were 
proper, and was not expected to do so, but acted on the 
assurances of others authorized to give them. When his 
signature on a check was desired, the check~ fully' made out, 
wa:s presented to him, . together with a 'debit ticket,' which 
showed the name of the payee, the purpose foi'· which the 
Gheck was drawn, its amount and the number of the trust 
involved. At the bottom of it were also separate spaces 
headed respectively hy the words 'Prepared by,' 'Author-
izedby,"Signed by,' and 'Funds O. K.'In these spaces 
initials or names of certain authorized persons were written 
by them. When a check and one of these tickets was pre-
sented to Hadley his custom, as he testified to it, was to 
look first to see if one of the authorized persons, of whom 
he had a list, had signed under 'Authorized by,' and then 
'to see if the "Funds O. K." was initialed by-a person hav-
ing authority to so initial it; and then 1 examined the 
amount set forth in the ticket, and turned it over and exam-
ined on the check to see if it was protectographed in that 
amount; and then I initialed it under "Signed by" and 
signed the check.' He did not look to see who the payee 
of the check was or what was the purpose of the payment 
or the name, purpose or number of the trust. It was physi-
cally impossible for him to do that work and the bank did 
not expect him to do so. Hadley naturally had no recol-
lection of the checks involved here, but Ellis testified that . 
he presented them to Hadley and that in signing them 
Hadley followed his custom as just stated. Ellis was one 
of the persons authorized to sign debit tickets in the places 
looked at by Hadley. Ellis personally wrote the checks in: 
question and the debit tickets ·for them, initialed the latter 
and presented the checks to Hadley. 
"It is defendant's contention that under the circumstances 
above stated, the checks in question were,payable to bearer, 
within the intent of section 3090 of the Civil Code. If. this 
: .... 
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be so the checks could' be negotiated by mere delivery, no 
indorsement being necessary for that purpose. (Civ. Code, 
§ 3111.) Defendant's further contention that in such case 
defendant wo...J.d incur no liability on its guaranty of in-
dorsements appears to be conceded, ,and is correct. (Union 
B. & T. 00. v. Security-First Nat. Bk. (1937), 8 Ca1.2d 303, 
310 [65 P.2d 355].) 
"Section 3090 of the Civil Code, so far as material here, 
reads as follows: 'The instrument is payable to bearer-
... (3) When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or 
non-existing person, and such fact was known to the person . 
making it so payable . . . ' There is no doubt that, if Ellis' 
knowledge and intent are regarded as determinative, all the 
checks in question were payable to the order of a fictitious 
person, and this also, plaintiff concedes. While there was 
such a person as Bobbitt, Ellis did not intend that he should 
have any interest in the checlr.s and he had in fact no rights 
in them. This is sufficient to make him a fictitious payee, if 
Ellis was the person making the checks so payable, within 
the meaning of section 3090. (Union B. & T. 00. v. Secur-
ity-First Nat. Bk., supra.~ Of course, the character of the 
payee in this respect was known to Ellis, but it was not 
known to Hadley, who believed all checks signed by him to 
be regular and genuine in all respects and had no information 
to the contrary, nor was it known to any person connected 
with plaintiff, other than Ellis. The question for decision on 
section 3090 therefore resolves itself into these two questions: 
Was Ellis the person making these checks 'so payable,' or if 
not, was his knowledge on the subject chargeable to plaintiff? 
"It is now settled that 'the person making it so payable,' 
within the meaning of section 3090 above quoted, is not 
always or necessarily the nominal maker of a check or other 
negotiable instrument. (Union B. & T. 00. v. Security-First 
Nat. Bk., supraj Goodyear Tire etc. 00. v. Wells Fargo Bank 
(1934), 1 Cal..App.2d 694,702 [37 P.2d 483]; Rancho San 
Oarlos v. Bank of Italy (1932), 123 Cal.App. 291, 295 [11 
P.2d 424J.) In Union B. & T. Co. v. Security-First Nat. Bk., 
supra, the checks in question were cashier's checks of the 
plaintiff, issued at the request of an agent of one of plaintiff's 
depositors, made payable to persons named by him and de-
livered to him. He forged the payees' indorsements and ob-
tained the money on the checks. It was held that regarding 
the payees named in the checks the plaintiff had no intent 
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save that of following the agent's instructions and that since 
his intent was that fictitious payees be named, the checks we~e 
payable to bearer and plaintiff was not liable t~ the deposI-
tor' for paying on forged indorsemen~. The ~aIthl.ess a,gent 
was named Williams and the court saId on thl~ pom;: :rhe 
intended ficitious payee was the creature of Willi~ms mmd, 
and while the appellant Union Bank was the nommal maker 
of the cashier's checks, still Williams was the~ person who 
actually drew the bill and was the, person,ma~ng the cash-
ier's checks payable to a fictit~ous p~yee; ~nd s~ce he acte~, 
within the scope of his authOrIty, hlS act, mtent.and. kn.owl-
edge,although adverse to and a fraud ,upon hIS, 'Prlll~lpa1, 
are nevertheless binding upon the latter. (8 Ca1.2d 309.) 
"In Union B. &T. 00. v. Security-First Nat~ Bk., 8upra,the 
court cited with approval Rancho San Oarlo's. 'Y.' Bank 0/ 
Italy, supra, and Goodyear Tire etc. 00. v. W el~81!argO !lank, 
supra. In the Rancho San Carlos case the plamtii!delive~ed 
to an employee named Harris, who J;1~~ no authorIty to ~gn 
its checks, several duly signed checkS on, defendant ba~k 
which were· blank as to payees' names and ·~mounts. , T~l~ 
was done, according to custom, to enable HarrIS to pay plam-
tiff's bills. Harris filled out one of these checks for $10,000, 
naming as payee a real person who. ha~ no interest. in it an~ 
was not intended by Harris to receIve It, forged this payee s 
name and contrived to get the money. It was heldthl'!t 
plaintiff, by delivering the blank checks to Harris, gave him 
authority to fill the blanks, and further (at 123. Cal.App~ 
295): 'It has been held that the words "the person making 
it so payable" refer to the person who actua1~~ drew the check 
whether he be the nominal maker or not [CIting cases] i and 
in principle the same rule should apply where the per~oIi 
who actually makes the check payable is expressly or Im~ 
pliedly authorized to complete it in that manner.' For this. 
reason it was. held that the check was payable to bearer, 
under section 3090 of the Civil Code, and defendant bank 
was not liable to plaintiff as for payment on a forged in-
dorsement. 
"In the Goodyear case, supra, the plaintiff sued to reco~er 
money which it had deposited in defendant bank and whIch-
the latter had paid out on duly signed checks of plaintiff .. The 
plaintiff required two sign~tures o~ its checks, one o! the au-
thorized persons, Downs, bemg also Its controller and m charge 
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of its accounts. Downs wrote a number of checks to fictitious 
payees, representing no obligations of the corporation, and pre-
sented each of them to a cosigner, with or without supporting 
documents, sometimes signing it before and sometimes after the 
cosigner did. The cosigners signed the checks without investi-
gation, depending on'Downs and the system for assurance of 
their correctness. Downs then stole the checks,forged the 
payees' signatures and got the money they called for . It was 
held that these checks were, in contemplation of law, payable 
to bearer, and defendant was not liable to plaintiff on account 
of the forged indorsements. The court discussed the matter 
at great length and among other things said, at 1 Cal.App. 
2d 709: 'On the facts of this case the cosigners of Downs 
were mere automatons. Their names on the instruments gave 
them no more validity than did the corporate name printed 
thereon. They had just as much general intent with refer-
ence to the instruments involved as their corporate employer, 
and no more. For all practical purposes their names as well 
as that of the corporation might have been printed upon the 
checks. It is difficult to understand why any insurmountable 
legal barrier is created merely because on the facts in this 
case cosigners were required to affix and went through the 
motions of affixing their names at the time the che.cks were 
in the process of being drawn. If the cosigners had signed 
the checks in question in blank, then based upon every rule of 
reason and on the clear authority of the San Carlos case, 
supra, the checks were "bearer" checks. It would be no an-
swer to say that authority to sign the blank was not given, 
for the act of signing, would be within the scope of the au-
thority of the cosigners. The facts in this case establish be-
yond cavil that the cosigners did, as a practical matter, sign 
in blank.' 
"Under the facts of the case at bar Hadley was in sub-
stantially the same situation as that given to the cosigners 
of Downs in the case just quoted. Hadley did not even look 
at the names of the payees on a check and either he had no 
actual intent at all regarding them, or if he had any such 
intent it was, at most, to make the checks payable to the per-
sons intended by Ellis, and was thus like that of the bank 
which issued the cashier's checks involved in Union B. &i T. 
Co. v. Security-First Nat. Bk.,supra. There must be an intent 
somewhere as to the payee to be named in a check and if the 
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si~er of the' check has none that intent m~s: .be. sough~ else-
where; If the plaintiff should use a check wrltmg mach~e by 
which signatures were mechanically placed on checks, WIthout 
any attention to.the contents ofthechec~?y the;persons whose 
signatures 'were thus placed on them, .1tlS ObVIOUS that such 
persons would have no intent whatever m regard to such, check!'> 
and the intent of those authorized to operat~ the machme, de-
void of inteilt,and the intent whichdetermlile~ the ch~racte.r 
of the check, on the question whether the payee s na~e l~ fict~­
tious, must be that of the one who operated the machl~e, m thlS 
.case, Ellis. As in the Goodyear case, s~pral the !sIgnatu,re, 
though made after the payee's name was m the check, was as 
a practical matter, in blank,' and hence is subject to the rule 
of the San Carlos case, supt'a. ..' . 
"In opposition to this conclusion plamtIff CItes and rehes 
on Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Sav. Ban~ (~919), 180 Cal. . 
601 [182 'P. 293, 5 A.L.R. 1193]. . The pl~mtIff there was a 
corporation doing an extensive busmess, WIth several depart-
ments. One of these, in charge of one Emory, as ma:nag;r, 
made many disbursements by check. Emory had no authorIty 
to sign checks, and to obtain a check he prepared a demand 
showing the. purpose of the payment and the person to wh~~ 
it was to be made. This demand was sent to the accountm", 
department where it was examined a?,d if found correct a 
check was prepared and presented WIth th~ demand to the 
officers authorized to sign checks and the SIgned check was 
. returned to Emory's department for delivery to the payee. 
Emory, like Ellis in this case, prepared fictitious demands, 
and oile real demand, in favor of named person~, some .. of 
whom. were fictitious and some real,. got possessIOn, of the 
checks signed for these demands, indorsed the payees t;lames 
on them and thereby obtained thfl money payable. o~ them. 
The checks were drawn on defendant bank and plamtIff sued 
to recover the amount paid on these forged mdorsements. 
One of the defenses was that the checks were in law payable 
to bearer, because of Emory's intent regarding them, but the 
court said, at p.606; 'Emory did not execute the checks on 
behalf of the company. It is the intention of the officers who 
did that must be taken to be the intention of thecQmpan!. 
The execution of the checks was one within the scope of the~r 
authority, not within that of Emory. As to these o:ffic~r~, It 
is plain that they did. not intend to execute checks to fictItIOUS 
'1, 
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parties or to pay money to the person to whom Emory in-
tended it should be paid, to wit, himself. They intended to 
pa.y mO.ney to what they believed to be existent persons, and 
thIS bemg so, the checks 'cannot be considered as made to 
fictit!ous payees.', This statement, while accurate enough as 
appbed to the facts of that case, does not entirely conform 
to the later decisions just reviewed, and some limitation must 
be put upon it to bring it into such conformity. In that case 
an audit was interposed between Emory, who prepared the 
demands, and the officers who signed the checks the purpose 
of which was to determine whether the checks w~re proper or 
not. The signing officers were not mere automatons but acted 
upon the results of such audit and it was quite proper to 
regard them as having an intent regarding the checks~' But 
where the actual signer of the check has and in the nature 
of the operation can have, no intent at all as to the payee 
as where he signs in ?lan~ (Rancho San Oarlos v, Bank' of 
!taly, supra) or complIes wIth the request of another, with no 
llltent except to do what is asked (Union B. &; T. 00. v. Secur-itu-~irst Nat. Bk., supra), or is a mere automaton signing with-
out m:e~t (G.oodyear Tire etc. 00. v. Wells Fargo Bank, su-
1Jra )! It IS ObVIOUS that the character of the check cannot be de-
~ermmed on his nonexistent intent, and the controlling intent 
IS that of the person who, within the scope of his authority, 
fixes the name of the payee. In this case that persoil was F:aiis: 
It ~lUstbe understood that oUr decision is based on the system 
WhICh was so set up bY' plaintiff as to eliminate from the dut; 
of .Hadley, .as the aetual signer of a check, any consideration 
of ItS prpprlety, and particularly to relieve him from any neces-
~ity of even looking at the payee's name. If he had 'any duty 
In these re~pects, butperfo~med it negligently or perfunctorily 
or even omItted to perform It at all on some particular occasion 
a different result might follow." , 
The judgment should be reversed. 
Carter, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May, 27, 
1943: Shenk, J.,. ~nd Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. Schauer, 
J., dId not partIcIpate therein. 
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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. GEORGE, KELLEY, 
Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Evidence-C()mpetency-Evidence Wrongfully 
Obtained.-Although the federal courts forbid' the introdu?-
tion of evidence illegally obtained from the, accused upon hIS 
timely motion for its exclusion, the accepted rule in ,California 
is to the contrary. , .' 
[2] Id.-Evidence-CompetencY-Evidence WrongfullY Obtained-
Unlawful Seizure.-The use of evidence obtained ,through an 
illegal search and seizure does not constitute a ~eniaLof ~ue 
process of law, since that does not affect the faIrness or Im-
partiality of the trial. . 
[3] Id.-Evidence-CompetencY-Evidence Wrongfully Obtained 
-Telephone Calls.-Assuming that the Federal ,Communica-
tions Act of 1934, § 605 (48 State. 1064,1103; '47 U.S.C. ~05), 
which declares that no person not authorj.zed, by the sender 
shall intercept or divulge the contents ofcolIlID,ililications, ap:-
plies to evidence offered in a state, court;.suchetatute does .n~~ 
render inadmissible the testimony of pohce ,officers a~to tele-
phone calls received by them in an ,ai>artinen~ .wh~ch' a~cllse4 
occupied with equipment for the p~ose of recor4mg'~et.s,. aI" 
the accused was not 1\ party to the mtercepted' commun~~a,tl0n' 
, and hence was not a "sender" entitled to tlieprotection of ,tpe 
statute. '. 
[4] Gaming - Prosecutions - Appeal ~ :a;li.rmless and, :R,eyersi~l!l 
Error.-In a prosecution for occttp.Ylng an apart~e~t Wlt.h 
equipment for the purpos.e' of recordlli~ bets" assummg th~~~~t 
was error to allow a pohce officer to Interpret .. ,theterm , 1:r;t-
sured" in one of the telephone messages~hich ,he interce~ted;, . 
and to testify that certain, places were race tracks'on. the 'd"y, 
of defendant's arrest, such error ,was 'not prejudicial,wh':t~ 
themessages received by the officer, excluding the terms wlD.ili 
he explained, were sufficient to support a verdi<it'o~ guilty. ',. 
[5] Id.-Prosecution-Appeal-Harmless and :Reversible Err~ 
Hearsay EvidllDce.-In a prosecution for occupying an apa;rt... 
ment with equipment for the purpose of recording bets; it' W'ILS 
[2] Evidence obtained by illegal search ,andseiiure; note, ~ 
A.L.R. 348. See, also, 8 Cal.Jur. 78; 20 Am.Jur. 352. 
McK. Dig. References: ::1, 3] Criminal Law, § 409; [2] Crim" 
inalLaw; § 410 j [4, 5] Gaming, § 24 •. 
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